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WHEN GOVERNMENT MUST PAY: 
COMPENSATING RIGHTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Kenneth Agran' 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 1993, Republican political consultant Ed 
Rollins, the architect of President Reagan's 1984 landslide re-
election victory, had good reason to gloat after his latest political 
triumph. He'd just guided Christine Todd Whitman to a remark-
able victory over incumbent Democrat Jim Florio in New Jer-
sey's gubernatorial race. Speaking to journalists in Washington, 
D.C., after the election, Rollins confessed that the key to Whit-
man's victory was a secret plan to suppress the black vote by 
funneling about $500,000 to black ministers and Democratic or-
ganizers to minimize or stop get-out-the-vote efforts on behalf of 
Governor Florio. As Rollins put it: "We went into the black 
churches and basically said to ministers who had endorsed Flo-
rio: 'Do you have a special project [in need of financial support]? 
We see you have already endorsed Florio. That's fine, but don't 
get up in the Sunday pulpit and preach. Don't get up there and 
say it's your moral obligation to vote on Tuesday, to vote for Jim 
Florio.'"2 Rollins added that the Whitman campaign had also 
approached workers for black mayors who were unhappy with 
Florio and said: "How much have they paid you to do your nor-
mal duty? We'll match it. Go home, sit and watch television.''3 
The result, Rollins reported: "I think to a certain extent we sup-
pressed their votes."4 
I. Visiting Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School. 
2. GOP Spent Money to Suppress New Jersey Voting, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, No-
vember 10, 1993, at 2 (1993 WL 11121802). 
3. Thomas B. Edsall, GOP Consultant Describes Bribes to Suppress Black New 
Jersey Vote, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, November 10, 1993, at A2 (1993 WL 
6809913). 
4. /d. 
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The Whitman campaign immediately denied Rollins's 
claims, and Rollins himself later recanted: "I went too far. My 
remarks left the impression of something that was not true and 
did not occur."5 A federal grand jury investigated the matter, but 
it ultimately concluded that there was no evidence to back up 
the tale.6 
The Rollins story provoked understandable outrage. Under 
federal law and the laws of all 50 states, it is illegal to buy or sell 
votes.7 As a corollary to this general proscription, it is also gen-
erally illegal to pay someone not to vote.8 The right to vote is, af-
ter all, a cherished freedom-and a fundamental right central to 
constitutional democracy-that should not be available for pur-
chase or sale in the marketplace.9 As a legal and philosophical 
matter, the right to vote is inalienable along with the rights to 
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" that Thomas Jeffer-
son described so eloquently in the Declaration of Independ-
ence.10 
Now imagine for a moment that it was not a political candi-
date-a private citizen-who allegedly paid people not to vote, 
but instead a government official or a government agency. Sup-
pose, for example, that California's Franchise Tax Board, fearful 
that a high voter turnout will overwhelm the state's outdated 
election machinery, begins offering a $50 tax credit to every 
Californian over the age of 18 who refrains from voting in an up-
coming election. Such a policy would not only be illegal;11 it 
would almost certainly be unconstitutional. Just as state and lo-
cal governments may not impose a poll tax, 12 so too government 
5. The Boasting of Ed Rollins, WASHINGTON POST, November 12, 1993, at A24 
(1993 WL 2088907). 
6. Mike Kelly, Ed Rollins Rides Again, THE RECORD, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, 
February 25, 1996, at 01 (1996 WL 6078909). 
7. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324 & n.1 (2000) 
(listing federal and state prohibitions on the buying and selling of votes). 
8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2000) (imposing a fine or imprisonment on anyone 
who "makes or offers to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold 
his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate," as well as on anyone who "solicits, ac-
cepts, or receives any such expenditures in consideration of his vote or the withholding of 
his vote"). 
9. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) ("[A] State may surely prohibit a 
candidate from buying votes. No body politic worthy of being called a democracy en-
trusts the selection of leaders to a process of auction or barter."). 
10. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2000); CAL. ELEC. CODE§ 18521 (West 2004) (prohibiting 
gifts or other consideration to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting); CAL. 
ELEC. CODE § 18522 (West 2004) (prohibiting persons or controlled committees from 
making payments or offers to pay to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting). 
12. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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may not offer a financial incentive to induce people not to vote 
because such an incentive functions in precisely the same wal as 
a poll tax: It makes voting more costly relative to not voting. 1 
Now consider the more controversial issue of abortion. If it 
is unconstitutional for government to offer its citizens a financial 
incentive not to vote, shouldn't it be similarly unconstitutional 
for government to offer women a financial incentive not to pro-
cure an abortion? Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is no. Con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in Maher v. Roe14 and 
Harris v. McRae/ 5 federal and state governments can-and do-
offer poor pregnant women such financial incentives through the 
Medicaid program by subsidizing medical expenses incident to 
pregnancy and childbirth while denying coverage for medical 
services related to abortion. 
Maher and McRae have provoked intense criticism because 
they sanction government programs that appear to undermine 
Roe v. Wade 16 by inducing poor pregnant women to bear chil-
dren that they might otherwise choose not to have. 17 Maher and 
McRae effectively transform abortion-a liberty protected by 
the fundamental right to privac~-into a commodity, available 
only to those who can afford it. 8 This result is morally and le-
gally indefensible to those who believe that if a fundamental 
right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 19 or "deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"20 then government 
13. A tax credit offered to those who refrain from voting might also be regarded as 
an unconstitutional "penalty" on the right to vote under the Supreme Court's "unconsti-
tutional conditions" cases. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding un-
constitutional the denial of a veterans' property tax exemption for failure to subscribe to 
a loyalty oath); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (invalidating a one-year 
residency requirement imposed as a prerequisite for eligibility for welfare); Memorial 
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1974) (invalidating a one-year resi-
dency requirement imposed as a condition for non-emergency hospitalization or medical 
care at the county's expense). 
14. 432 u.s. 464 (1977). 
15. 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
16. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
17. See generally Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in 
the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 
1113 (1980); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion Funding Decisions: 
On Private Rights in the Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313 (1981); Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the 
Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1985). 
18. See Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Pri-
vacy?, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTERJ. 181,196-204 (1991). 
19. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,324 (1937). 
20. Moore v. City of East Oeveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977). 
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ought to provide affirmative assistance to guarantee access to 
that right, regardless of ability to pay. 
For years, constitutional scholars and the Supreme Court it-
self have struggled to define the circumstances under which gov-
ernment must affirmatively guarantee constitutional rights for 
the poor. These attempts have been largely unsuccessful. They 
have been either too ambitious, relying on theories that have 
proven to be judicially unmanageable and unacceptable, or too 
limited in their scope and reach, relying on theories that are ex-
planatory but not prescriptive. I hope to provide a fresh perspec-
tive on the problem, along with a better framework with which 
to evaluate claims that government must provide affirmative as-
sistance to the poor to ensure access to constitutional rights. 
Part I of this Article analyzes a series of Supreme Court de-
cisions-the "equal access" cases-that provide a constitutional 
basis for the notion that government must affirmatively guaran-
tee constitutional rights for the poor. Part II contends that these 
decisions are often described either far too broadly, in terms of 
equal protection for the poor, or far too narrowly, in terms of a 
fundamental right of access to the courts or the political process. 
I suggest an alternative approach. The equal access cases may 
best be understood as recognizing a category of "compensating 
rights," in which government's obligation to affirmatively guar-
antee certain constitutional rights is designed to compensate for 
government coercion that burdens those rights. Part II then ex-
plores the theory of compensating rights in some detail, consid-
ering basic questions such as which rights and what degree of co-
ercion should trigger government's duty to compensate. Finally, 
Part III applies the theory of compensating rights to the abortion 
funding decisions in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae. Just as 
the equal access cases require the government to compensate for 
coercive financial barriers that threaten to deny access to the 
courts or the political process, so too government must compen-
sate for the coercive pressure designed to persuade poor women 
to choose childbirth over abortion. 
I. THE EQUAL ACCESS CASES 
One of the chief analytical tools of constitutional interpreta-
tion is the basic distinction between positive and negative rights. 
The conventional thinking is that the Constitution confers no 
positive right to governmental aid or assistance; instead, the 
Constitution operates in a negative fashion, preventing the gov-
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ernment from abridging certain rights or freedoms. It is often 
said that the Bill of Rights guarantees freedom from government 
interference, not a right to governmental assistance. As the Su-
preme Court explained in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services: 21 
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the 
State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal 
levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to de-
prive individuals of life, liberty, or property without "due 
process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended to 
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that 
those interests do not come to harm through other means .... 
Consistent with these principles, our cases have recognized 
that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative 
right to governmental aid, even when such aid may be neces-
sary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the 
government itself may not deprive the individual.22 
While the distinction between positive and negative rights 
offers a useful guideline for constitutional interpretation and al-
lows the courts to quickly and easily dispose of dubious claims to 
various constitutional "entitlements," it ignores a long line of de-
cisions that challenge the conventional wisdom and blur the dis-
tinction between positive and negative rights. Fifty years in the 
making, these decisions recognize that constitutional rights are 
meaningless without the economic resources to enjoy them and 
that under certain circumstances, government must bear the 
costs of securing access to such rights for poor individuals other-
wise unable to pay. 
In Griffin v. Illinois/3 the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of equal protection and 
due process required a state to provide a trial transcript at its 
own expense to an indigent convict who could not otherwise ef-
fectively take advantage of the right to an appeal-a right which 
Illinois made generally available to all who could afford it: 
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants 
must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants 
who have money enough to buy transcripts. "24 For the first time, 
the Supreme Court seriously wrestled with Anatole France's 
21. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
22. /d. at 195-96. 
23. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
24. /d. at 19. 
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challenge to the value of a guarantee of legal equality in the face 
of economic inequality: "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids 
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
streets, and to steal bread. "25 The Supreme Court apparently 
agreed that when a poor man's liberty was at stake, the Constitu-
tion required that the courthouse doors be open to him, even if 
the state must bear the cost. 
Seven years later, in Gideon v. Wainwright/6 the Supreme 
Court dramatically extended Griffin's reach, unanimously hold-
ing that in a state prosecution involving the possibility of a sub-
stantial prison sentence, due process requires that a defendant 
be provided access to counsel regardless of his ability to pay. In 
Douglas v. California,27 decided the same day as Gideon, the 
Court held that the government must provide indigent criminal 
defendants with free counsel on any initial appeal that a state's 
appellate courts must hear. Once again, the Court was emphatic 
in requiring that the instruments of justice be available to rich 
and poor alike: 
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, en-
joys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, re-
search of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, 
while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary deter-
mination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for 
himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the er-
rors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, 
while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.28 
While Griffin, Gideon, and Douglas all concerned equal ac-
cess to the judicial process, the Warren Court was similarly zeal-
ous in preserving equal access to the political process. In Harper 
v. Virginia Board of Elections/9 the Court invalidated an annual 
poll tax of $1.50 on all Virginia residents over the age of 21. 
Conceding that "a State maJ exact fees from citizens for many 
different kinds of licenses," the Court nevertheless concluded 
that voting cannot hinge upon the ability to pay because the 
right to vote is a "fundamental political right ... preservative of 
25. JOHN BARTLETI, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (15th ed. 1980) 
(quoting A. FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (1894)). 
26. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
27. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
28. !d. at 357-58. 
29. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
30. !d. at 668. 
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all rights."31 The Court did not stop there, however. Citing Grif-
fin and Douglas, Justice Douglas, writing for a six-member ma-
jority, seemed to suggest that legislative classifications based on 
wealth, like those based on race, are "suspect" classifications 
triggering strict judicial scrutiny: "Wealth, like race, creed, or 
color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently 
in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or 
property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.'m 
The Warren Court's activism on behalf of the poor led some 
scholars to turn the positive/negative rights distinction on its 
head and to suggest that government has an affirmative constitu-
tional obligation to provide all citizens with a minimally decent 
subsistence.33 By today's standards, such proposals seem to verge 
on the ridiculous, but the fact that they were serious proposals 
when written is indicative of how far the Supreme Court had 
gone-and seemed prepared to go-in ensuring basic rights for 
the poor. 
With the end of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court's 
ideological makeup shifted dramatically to the right, ending all 
hope for the kind of revolution that Griffin, Gideon, Douglas, 
and Harper seemed to promise. Indeed, in San Antonio Inde-
pendent ~chool District v. Rodriguez,34 the Supreme Court ex-
pressly held that wealth is not a suspect classification, rejecting 
Iangua9e in Harper and other cases that seemed to suggest oth-
erwise. 5 But the Court remained surprisingly committed to the 
31. !d. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886)). 
32. !d. at 668 (citations omitted). 
33. See, e.g., Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CAL. L. 
REV. 407, 408 (1966) ("By reasoning similar to that by which we have recently come to 
understand that the guarantee of due process requires a lawyer to be provided for per-
sons too poor to engage private counsel ... this paper works its way to conclusions re-
quiring, as matters of constitutional entitlement, provision of the minimal necessaries of 
membership-and not merely existence-in our society."); Frank Michelman, On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 35 (1969) 
(proposing a theory of minimum protection which would require government to mitigate 
the effects of the private marketplace when "persons have important needs or interests 
which they are prevented from satisfying because of traits or predicaments not adopted 
by free and proximate choice"); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitu-
tion: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (arguing for a consti-
tutional right to "survival" or "subsistence" income); Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Re-
flections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) 
(deriving a constitutional right to a decent material basis for life from the Declaration of 
Independence, from the preamble to the Constitution, and from parts of the Constitution 
proper). 
34. 411 u.s. 1 (1973). 
35. See id. at 28-29. 
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more limited principle in Griffin, Gideon, Douglas, and Harper: 
equality of access to the legal and political systems. 
In Boddie v. Connecticut/6 for example, the Court extended 
Griffin, Gideon, and Douglas beyond the confines of criminal 
law, holding that due process prohibits a state from denying ac-
cess to its courts to poor persons who seek a divorce but who are 
unable to afford court fees and costs. Central to the Court's deci-
sion in Boddie was the "basic position of the marriage relation-
ship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant 
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this rela-
tionship. "3 
Boddie suggested that government may be required to sub-
sidize access to the courts in all civil cases. The Supreme Court 
moved quickly to clarify its reasoning in United States v. Kras/8 
holding that the government was not required to waive a $50 fil-
ing fee for an indigent bankruptcy petitioner. The denial of ac-
cess to a judicial forum in Boddie, the Court explained, touched 
directly "on the marital relationship and on the associational in-
terests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that 
relationship," interests of "fundamental importance" under the 
Constitution.39 A bankruptcy petitioner's interest in eliminating 
debt and in obtaining a new start in life, though important, do 
"not rise to the same constitutionallevel."40 Three months later, 
Ortwein v. Schwab41 relied on the same distinction in holding 
that government was not obliged to waive a $25 fee for an indi-
gent welfare recipient seeking to appeal an adverse welfare de-
termination. 
Post-Warren Court decisions requiring government to af-
ford equal political access to the poor are consistent with the 
principle set forth in Kras and Ortwein that the right to state as-
sistance depends upon the existence of a fundamental right. In 
Bullock v. Carter,42 the Court invalidated a Texas scheme under 
which candidates for local office had to pay ballot fees as high as 
$8,900. Bullock rejected as justifications for excluding poor can-
didates from the ballot the state's concern about unwieldy bal-
36. 401 u.s. 371 (1971). 
37. /d.at374. 
38. 409 u.s. 434 (1973). 
39. /d. at 444. 
40. I d. at 445. 
41. 410 u.s. 656 (1973). 
42. 405 u.s. 134 (1972). 
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lots and its interest in financing elections.43 In Lubin v. Panish,44 
the Court invalidated a California statute requiring payment of a 
ballot access fee fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office 
sought, explaining that a state may not require from an indigent 
candidate "fees he cannot pay."45 While both Bullock and Lubin 
avoid any suggestion that classifications based on wealth are sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny, the Court's commitment to equal ac-
cess to the political process preserves-and extends-the central 
holding of Harper. 
In Little v. Streater,46 the Court revisited ahd extended its 
decision in Boddie by holding that an indigent defendant in a 
state-supported paternity action could not be denied access to a 
blood grouping test merely because of his inability to pay. In re-
quiring the state to pay for the blood test, the Court emphasized 
the magnitude of the interests at stake in a paternity action: 
The private interests implicated here are substantial. Apart 
from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a 
substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened 
by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the 
creation of a parent-child relationship. This Court frequently 
has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not 
legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional 
protection. Just as the termination of such bonds demands 
procedural fairness, so too does their imposition. 47 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,48 decided the 
same day as Streater, the Court held that under certain circum-
stances, due process may require the state to appoint counsel for 
an indigent parent faced with termination of his or her parental 
rights. Though the Court declined to require the appointment of 
counsel in all such cases, including the Lassiter case itself, the 
Court did note: 
Informed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent 
parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not 
only in parental termination proceedings, but also in depend-
ency and neglect proceedings as well. Most significantly, 33 
States and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the 
appointment of counsel in termination cases. The Court's 
43. See id. at 144-49. 
44. 415 U.S. 7(1) (1974). 
45. /d. at 718. 
46. 452 u.s. 1 (1981). 
47. /d. at 13 (citations omitted). 
48. 452 u.s. 18 (1981). 
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opinion today in no way implies that the standards increas-
ingly urged by informed public opinion and now wide~ fol-
lowed by the States are other than enlightened and wise. 
Though many of the Supreme Court's most important deci-
sions requiring the state to subsidize access to the judicial proc-
ess were decided by a more liberal and more activist Court, the 
current Court continues to breathe new life into this area of the 
law. Over sharp dissents from the three most conservative Jus-
tices then on the Court-Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia-
M. L. B. v. S. L.J. 50 held that Mississippi was required to waive ap-
pellate costs for an indigent mother who sought to appeal an or-
der terminating her parental rights. Echoing Boddie and Streater, 
the Court was especially mindful of the fact that the state was 
seeking to terminate a parent-child bond, state action which 
strikes at the core of fundamental privacy rights. 51 
Gone from the post-Warren Court equal access cases is the 
passionate rhetoric decrying the plight of the poor. The later de-
cisions reflect a more distant judicial temperament and are more 
firmly grounded doctrinally in the tepid language of procedural 
due process rather than the Warren era's open flirtations with 
the notion of equal protection for the poor. But beyond the rhe-
torical and doctrinal shifts, a basic principle emerges virtually 
unchanged: The enjoyment of certain fundamental rights ought 
not depend on the size of one's pocketbook. 
II. A THEORY OF COMPENSATING RIGHTS 
Spanning criminal and civil cases, and dealing with a broad 
range of underlying constitutional rights and doctrines, the equal 
access cases defy easy categorization. At the height of the War-
ren era, these decisions were thought to provide a constitutional 
basis for the recognition of positive rights, at least with respect to 
the minimum necessities of life.52 Later commentators regarded 
the decisions as an early and ultimately unsuccessful effort to 
strike a blow against wealth classifications and economic ine-
quality.53 Today, the most popular constitutional law textbooks 
49. Id. at 33-34. 
50. 519 u.s. 102 (1996). 
51. See id. at 116-17 ("M.L.B.'s case, involving the State's authority to sever per-
manently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the Court has long re-
quired when a family association so undeniably important is at stake."). 
52. See sources cited supra note 33. 
53. See, e.g., Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amend-
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describe the cases as recognizing a fundamental right of "access 
to the courts. "54 
These attempts to explain the equal access cases miss a 
more subtle-but perhaps more important-unifying principle. 
Stripped of their rhetorical and doctrinal nuances, on a very ba-
sic level these cases reflect a commitment to providing the indi-
vidual with the means, financial or otherwise, to resist govern-
ment coercion, particularly with respect to fundamental rights. 
The coercion may be as modest as it was in Boddie, where a $60 
court fee effectively prevented poor persons from filing divorce 
petitions, burdening the fundamental right to marry. Or the co-
ercion may be far more substantial and direct, as it was in 
Gideon, where all of the resources and prosecutorial power of 
the state were brought to bear upon an unrepresented indigent 
criminal defendant, whose physical freedom -liberty in its pur-
est sense-was at stake. 
The Court's concern with governmental coercion is evident 
from a close reading of the equal access cases. In Gideon, for ex-
ample, the Court viewed the appointment of counsel as an essen-
tial counterweight to the coercive power of the state's criminal 
justice system: 
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him .... Governments, 
both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of 
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of 
crime .... Similarly, there are few defendants charged with 
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can 
ment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 435,436 (1%7); Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-
Education, Municipal Services and Wealth, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1972); Gary 
S. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indi-
gent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REv. 223 (1970); Gerald Gunther, In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-20 (1972); see also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CoNSTITtJilON'S THIRD CENTURY 383-85 (3d ed. 2003) (character-
izing decisions such as Griffin, Gideon, Harper, and Boddie as early examples of the Su-
preme Court's application of heightened scrutiny to statutes which disadvantaged the poor, 
but noting the Court's later rejection of the proposition that wealth is a suspect classifica-
tion). 
54. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
860-70 (15th ed. 2004); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-
CoMMENfS-QUESilONS 1388-93 (9th ed 2001); ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, CoNsrrrtmONAL 
LAW 982-99 (2d ed. 2005); WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1055-60 (12th ed. 2005); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND NOTES 757...()3 (7th ed. 2003). 
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get to prepare and present their defenses. That government 
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the 
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of 
the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are ne-
cessities, not luxuries. 55 
A similar rationale explains Ake v. Oklahoma,56 which re-
quired that an indigent criminal defendant in a capital case be 
provided with a state-subsidized psychiatrist to aid in the prepa-
ration of his insanity defense when his sanity at the time of the 
offense is seriously in question. As the Court noted, "when the 
State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his 
criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the 
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's 
ability to marshal his defense. "57 
In Boddie, the coercion took a somewhat different form, in 
the state's monopoly over the procedures for dissolving a mar-
riage: 
[B]ecause resort to the state courts is the only avenue to dis-
solution of their marriages, [appellants' plight] is akin to that 
of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum effec-
tively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judi-
cial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realis-
tic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his 
interests in court. 58 
In Streater, pervasive state involvement in the paternity ac-
tion rendered the proceedings "quasi-criminal" in nature, exert-
ing coercive pressure on the ~utative father comparable to that 
felt by a criminal defendant. 9 The state's failure to provide a 
complimentary blood test only magnified the coercive power of 
the state: 
[N]ot only is the State inextricably involved in paternity litiga-
tion such as this and responsible for an imbalance between 
the parties, it in effect forecloses what is potentially a conclu-
sive means for an indigent defendant to surmount that dispar-
ity and exonerate himself. Such a practice is irreconcilable 
with the command of the Due Process Clause.60 
55. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963). 
56. 470 u.s. 68 (1985). 
57. !d. at 80. 
58. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971). 
59. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 10 (1981). 
60. !d. at 12; see also id. at 16 ("Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a 
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Finally, in M.L.B., the state was required to waive appellate 
fees so that the appellant could effectively resist "the awesome 
authority of the State to destroy permanently all legal recogni-
tion of the parental relationship. "61 The Court further refined 
this principle elsewhere in the opinion: "[M.L.B.] is endeavoring 
to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and 
to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudica-
tion. Like a defendant resisting a criminal conviction, she seeks 
to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action."62 
With renewed focus on the Court's concern with coercion, 
the line of cases spanning Griffin to M.L.B. may be viewed as 
recognizing a variety of "compensating rights." The rights rec-
ognized in these cases are compensating in two senses. First, 
there is a compensating element in the literal sense, since gov-
ernment must pay the costs associated with guaranteeing access 
for the poor. And second, there is a compensating element in the 
metaphorical sense, since the government assistance is designed 
to counterbalance government pressure or coercion with respect 
to fundamental rights. My theory of compensating rights would 
require more careful judicial scrutiny whenever government-
created economic barriers effectively deny the poor access to a 
fundamental right. Closer scrutiny is also warranted when pri-
vate economic barriers that effectively deny the poor access to a 
fundamental right are coupled with government pressure or co-
ercion that burdens or discourages the exercise of the right. In 
these situations, government must either remove the source of 
the coercion or compensate for its effect by subsidizing the exer-
cise of the right. 
Framed in these terms, the equal access cases begin to make 
more sense. Many of the court access cases, including Griffin, 
Boddie, and M.L.B., involve government-created economic bar-
riers-court fees-that jeopardize the ability of indigent litigants 
to protect fundamental rights. The political access cases-
Harper, Bullock, and Lubin-are of the same ilk. Government-
imposed fees in those cases jeopardized the ability of indigent 
voters and candidates to participate in the political process. 
paternity case, an indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adver.;ary when the child 
is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the evidentiary burden Con-
necticut imposes, lacks a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the require-
ment of fundamental fairness expressed by the Due Process Clause was not satisfied 
here.") 
61. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (citation and internal quotations omit-
ted). 
62. /d. at 105. 
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Situations in which government itself erects such economic bar-
riers would seem to present the strongest-and simplest-case 
for judicial intervention. 
The more difficult cases are the ones like Gideon, Douglas, 
and Streater, where the economic barrier that jeopardizes a fun-
damental right is not government-created, but is instead a prod-
uct of the individual's own indigency. In such cases, government 
cannot simply remove the economic barrier, but must instead at-
tempt to counterbalance the coercion, taking into account the 
degree of pressure exerted by the government and the impor-
tance of the right at stake for the individual. The high degree of 
government coercion in Gideon, Douglas, and Streater, coupled 
with the enormously high stakes for the individual defendants-
the loss of physical liberty in Gideon and Douglas and the poten-
tial imposition of paternity in Streater-led the Court to con-
clude that compensation was constitutionally required. 
While the equal access cases are perhaps the best examples 
of compensating rights, the theory also explains other constitu-
tional doctrines. The Fifth Amendment's requirement that gov-
ernment pay "just compensation" when it takes private property 
for public use is a compensating right in both senses. The consti-
tutionally required compensation guarantees that the individual 
is not powerless in the face of government's authority to zone, 
regulate, and even confiscate private property. The First 
Amendment requirement that government make available cer-
tain public forums for speech activities may also be viewed as a 
compensating right. The obligation to keep open certain areas 
for speech activities, even at considerable public cost, counter-
balances legitimate restrictions on speech in other areas.63 And 
the Miranda warnings, along with the substantive rights refer-
enced in the warnings, are designed to counterbalance the inher-
ently coercive nature of custodial interrogation.64 
63. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of a Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 
SuP. Cr. REV. 1, 30 (comparing speech activities in public forums to "the poor man's 
printing press," and noting the importance of access to public forums for those "with lit-
tle access to the more genteel means of communication"); David Cole, Beyond Unconsti-
tutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675,717-23 (1992) (noting that the First Amendment's public forum doc-
trine serves to safeguard the openness of the marketplace of ideas by preserving access to 
a public resource central to public debate and dialogue); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that a city ordinance prohibiting loud 
and raucous sound trucks on public streets "can give an overpowering influence to views 
of owners of legally favored instruments of communication"). 
64. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("[W]ithout proper safeguards 
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
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If government must affirmatively guarantee access to consti-
tutional rights, which rights should qualify for such preferred 
treatment? For example, governments of all levels impose heavy 
taxes on cigarettes and actively seek to discourage smoking by 
restricting the advertisement, sale, and consumption of tobacco 
products. Must government waive cigarette taxes for the poor to 
counterbalance coercion designed to discourage smoking? The 
simple answer is no, because smoking is not a fundamental con-
stitutional right. 
The equal access cases support this important distinction, 
emphasizing the difference between government-created eco-
nomic barriers that burden fundamental constitutional rights and 
barriers that impinge upon far less important freedoms. The 
government was required to waive court filing fees in Boddie be-
cause they prevented the poor from obtaining divorces and bur-
dened the fundamental right to marry. In Kras and Ortwein, by 
contrast, no such fee waiver was required because neither the 
right to file for bankruptcy nor the right to appeal an adverse 
welfare decision was a fundamental constitutional right. 
Even within the class of fundamental rights, however, there 
are certain rights that, for lack of a better expression, just seem 
more fundamental than others. In his famous dissent in Olmstead 
v. United States,65 Justice Louis Brandeis observed that the "right 
to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men."66 To protect that right, 
"every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the pri-
vacy of the individual, whatever the means employed6 must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." 7 Justice 
Brandeis's thinking was well ahead of its time, and it would be 
another 37 years before the Supreme Court formally recognized 
a fundamental right to privacy implicit in the "penumbras" of 
the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.68 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist 
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to com-
bat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and 
the exercise of those rights must be fully honored."). 
65. 277 u.s. 438 (1928). 
66. !d. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
67. ld. 
68. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
112 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:97 
Though the right to privacy has a relatively short constitu-
tional pedigree when compared to other fundamental rights, 
commentators have recognized that personal decisions implicat-
ing the fundamental right to privacy occupy a special place. 
Ronald Dworkin argues that these "quasi-religious" decisions 
have a "profound spiritual character," involving judgments 
about the "intrinsic, cosmic importance of human life."69 Profes-
sor Margaret Radin argues that the concept of "personhood" 
embraces fundamental decisions that are "integral to the self' 
and that a failure to respect an individual's "moral commit-
ments" violates "our deepest understanding of what it is to be 
human."70 
While eloquent, these efforts to describe the special status 
of certain personal decisions don't capture what precisely it is 
about the right to privacy that sets it apart from other fundamen-
tal rights. The critical distinction lies in a consideration of the 
frequency and magnitude of the decisions protected by the right 
to privacy. Decisions about marriage, procreation, and abortion, 
for example, are not ones we face frequently; indeed, many peo-
ple confront these decisions just once in a lifetime. But while in-
frequent, the magnitude of these decisions cannot be overstated. 
A marriage or the birth of a child is a life-altering event which 
creates physical and emotional bonds and responsibilities that 
generally last a lifetime. Throughout our lives, we have countless 
opportunities to speak, associate, vote, and practice religion. 
While any restriction on these fundamental rights may be deeply 
offensive, such infringements on individual liberty somehow 
seem less significant when compared with the profound conse-
quences of governmental coercion with resJ?ect to the personal 
decisions at the heart of the right to privacy. 
69. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND lNDIVIDUALF'REEDOM 15,216--17 (1994). 
70. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1905-06 
(1987). 
71. At first blush, these views appear to present a challenge to the dominant Ely-
style political theories at the heart of current constitutional thought. See JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 100-104, 117, 181 (1980) (advocating a model of judi-
cial review concerned principally with "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process" 
rather than with the protection of substantive values). Without question, the political 
rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution are critical to democracy and self-
government, and should therefore be protected. But Ely himself concedes that "various 
rights not mentioned in the Constitution should nonetheless receive constitutional pro-
tection because of their role in keeping open the channels of political change." /d. at 172. 
The right to privacy is one such right because it serves equally important values of 
autonomy and self-determination, values that facilitate political participation. Indeed, 
constitutional protection of the right to privacy-particularly those facets of the nght 
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The Supreme Court itself appeared to embrace these senti-
ments in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey:72 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education .... These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under compulsion of the State.7 
An interesting line of decisions dealing with the rights of 
prisoners adds additional support to the notion of a sort of hier-
archy of fundamental rights, with the right to privacy occupying 
a preferred constitutional position. As a general matter, prison-
ers don't fare particularly well when asserting that their funda-
mental rights have been violated. Indeed, the Court appears to 
have accepted the notion that prisoners essentially forfeit many 
of their constitutional rights. The right to speak and communi-
cate with fellow prisoners and the outside world, the right to as-
sociate, the right to practice religion, and the right to be free 
from intrusive searches are either nonexistent or severely cir-
cumscribed behind prison walls.74 Indeed, a state may perma-
concerned with reproductive freedom-is an essential means of safeguarding full and 
equal political participation for women. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) ("The ability of women to participate equally 
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to con-
trol their reproductive lives."); see also id. at 928 (Biackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy 
also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."). 
72. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
73. /d. at 851 (citations omitted). 
74. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) 
(inmates may be prohibited from meeting in groups); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 
(1974) (prison officials may open attorney-inmate mail in the presence of the inmate); 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison may prohibit face-to-face media interviews 
with inmates); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (prison may ban contact visits); 
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (prison may prohibit non-contact family visits 
with minor nieces and nephews and children as to whom parental rights have been ter-
minated); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding a prison regula-
tion preventing Islamic inmates from attending weekly religious services); Bell v. Wolf-
ish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding warrantless searches of prison cells and body-cavity 
searches following a contact visit). 
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nently deprive convicted felons of the right to vote, even after 
the sentence and parole have been completed.75 
In cases dealing with procreation, marriage, and bodily in-
tegrity, however, the Supreme Court has been highly protective 
of prisoners' rights. Nearly a quarter century before Griswold, 
Skinner v. Oklahoma76 invalidated a law that permitted the ster-
ilization of habitual criminals: "We are dealing here with legisla-
tion which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race. "77 
In Winston v. Lee,78 the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited a state from compelling 
a robbery suspect to undergo surgery to remove a bullet which 
the state needed for evidentiary purposes, despite testimony that 
the surgery involved few medical risks. The Supreme Court ex-
pressed a profound concern for the right to bodily integrity, an 
aspect of the right to privacy protected both by the Fourth 
Amendment and the Griswold line of privacy cases.79 
Finally, in Turner v. Safley,80 the Supreme Court struck 
down a prison regulation which prohibited inmates from marry-
ing other inmates or civilians without the prison warden's con-
sent. Using language similar to that which appeared later in Ca-
sey, the Supreme Court found that the right to marry was every 
bit as fundamental in prison as it is beyond prison walls. 81 In an-
other part of the Turner opinion, however, the Court u~held a 
regulation prohibiting inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 2 Plac-
ing these two parts of the opinion side by side, Turner seems to 
suggest that the right to marry is simply more fundamental than 
the right to speech, even in the restrictive environment of a 
prison. 
75. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
76. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
77. Id. at 541. 
78. 470 u.s. 753 (1985). 
79. See id. at 759 ("A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evi-
dence ... implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the in-
trusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime."); see also 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) ("[A prisoner's] interest in avoiding the 
unwarranted administration of antipsychotic drugs is not insubstantial. The forcible injec-
tion of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interfer-
ence with that person's liberty."). 
80. 482 U.S. 78 (1987}. 
81. See id. at 95-96. 
82. See id. at 91-93. 
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While the Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowl-
edged any kind of hierarchy of fundamental rights, these prison-
ers' rights cases do suggest just such a hierarchy. The Court is 
hostile to prisoners with respect to most fundamental rights, in-
cluding the rights to speak, associate, vote, and practice religion. 
But when it comes to fundamental rights such as marriage, pro-
creation, and bodily integrity-rights protected by the more 
general right to privacy-the Court is far more receptive. This 
apparent hierarchy provides real content to Justice Brandeis's 
observation in Olmstead that "the right to be let alone" is "the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men. "83 
If government coercion with respect to any fundamental 
right is of constitutional concern, then government coercion with 
respect to our "most valued" constitutional right, the right to 
privacy, is particularly worrisome. And when government ac-
tions exert a coercive influence on personal decisions or rela-
tionships protected by the right to privacy, government may be 
constitutionally required to render affirmative assistance de-
signed to counterbalance the coercion and to enable the individ-
ual to make life-altering decisions in a truly free and voluntary 
fashion. The life-altering quality of the right at stake in Boddie, 
Streater, and M.L.B. -the right to marry in Boddie, the potential 
imposition of paternity in Streater, and the right to maintain a 
parent/child relationship in M.L.B. -led the Court to conclude 
that government assistance was necessary to counterbalance 
government coercion. Indeed, the Court treated the threat to 
personal liberty in Boddie, Streater, and M.L.B. as comparable to 
the possibility of the complete loss of physical freedom that trig-
gered compensating obligations in criminal cases such as Griffin, 
Gideon, and Douglas.84 
The extraordinary importance of the personal decisions pro-
tected by the right to privacy has led some scholars to argue that 
our traditional understanding of the negative nature of constitu-
tional rights ought to be abandoned in favor of a more positive 
83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(emphases added). 
84. Lassiter is something of an anomaly, for the Court declined to require the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent parents facing parental termination proceedings. While 
noting that due process might require the appointment of counsel in certain circum-
stances, the Court apparently felt that an inflexible constitutional rule was unnecessary in 
light of the fact that nearly two-thirds of the states had by statute provided for the ap-
pointment of counsel in parental termination cases. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. 
Serv., 452 U.S. 18,31-34 (1981). 
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conception of the right to privacy, one which recognizes that 
"the abstract freedom to choose is of meager value without 
meaningful options from which to choose and the ability to ef-
fectuate one's choice."85 According to this view, the right to pri-
vacy "includes not only the negative proscription against gov-
ernment coercion, but also the affirmative duty of government to 
protect the individual's personhood from degradation and to fa-
cilitate the processes of choice and self-determination."86 
This argument has a certain emotional and philosophical 
appeal, but even at the height of the Warren era, the Supreme 
Court never embraced such an idealistic conception of the Con-
stitution. The difficulty, then and now, lies in drawing reasonable 
lines. If government is obliged to affirmatively protect privacy 
simply because of its importance to the individual, then why 
shouldn't government likewise be obliged to subsidize other con-
stitutional rights that may be important to an individual? And 
why, for that matter, shouldn't government be obliged to pro-
vide all citizens with adequate food, housing, and health care, 
the basic necessities of life without which constitutional rights 
are virtually meaningless? 
This Article's theory of compensating rights provides a 
much firmer constitutional basis-one that the Supreme Court 
has already implicitly accepted in the equal access cases-for 
recognition of a government duty to render affirmative assis-
tance in those limited circumstances in which government coer-
cion burdens a fundamental right. Compensating rights fill the 
gap between the extremes of positive and negative rights, avoid-
ing the intractable questions of line-drawing that have prevented 
broader judicial acceptance of the notion of positive rights, but 
providing a workable framework to correct the injustices that re-
sult from a purely negative conception of constitutional free-
doms. 
85. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.1419, 1478 (1991). See also 
id. at 1478 ("The definition of privacy as a purely negative right serves to exempt the 
state from any obligation to ensure the social conditions and resources necessary for self-
determination and autonomous decisionmaking.") 
86. ld. at 1479; see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,§ 15-
2, at 1395 (2d ed. 1988) ("Ultimately, the affirmative duties of government cannot be sev-
ered from its obligations to refrain from certain forms of control; both must respond to a 
substantive vision of the needs of human personality."); Collin & Collin, supra note 18, at 
202 ("[I]f a fundamental right is something so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' 
or 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' then it seems to be a cost that the 
citizens of this nation agree must be borne in order to secure the type of society its mem-
bers believe it to be and hope it will remain."). 
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The equal access cases do not directly define the degree of 
coercion that is necessary to trigger government's duty to com-
pensate. This is the far more difficult question, since many gov-
ernment actions may, in some subtle or indirect way, burden a 
fundamental constitutional right.87 For example, the availability 
of government funding for the arts may burden First Amend-
ment rights by encouraging some artists to produce works con-
taining patriotic messages, while simultaneously discouraging 
other artists from producing works critical of the government or 
its policies. Similarly, an anomaly in the tax code-known the 
"marriage penalty" -may burden the fundamental right to 
marry by making it more attractive from a tax standpoint for 
some couples to remain single.88 Is government funding of the 
arts constitutionally suspect? Is the anomaly in the tax code an 
unconstitutional "penalty" on the right to marry? The short an-
swer is no, but the explanation is somewhat more complicated. 
The question of what degree of coercion is necessary to 
trigger government's duty to compensate is essentially the same 
as the basic question that pervades virtually all constitutional 
analysis: What constitutes an "infringement" of a constitutional 
right? The Supreme Court has never provided a clear answer to 
this question- especially in the context of fundamental rights-
other than to observe that it considers the "directness and sub-
stantiality of the interference" with the right. 89 
The equal access cases do suggest that there are two types 
of governmental coercion that trigger a duty to compensate. The 
first type may be most easily described as "economic coercion," 
which typically takes the form of a government-created financial 
barrier that burdens a fundamental right. The poll tax in Harper, 
the candidate filing fees in Bullock and Lubin, and the court fees 
in Boddie are all examples of this first type of coercion. The sec-
ond type may be described as "power and resources coercion" 
because it stems from the inequality of power and resources be-
87. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Bur-
dens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1175 (1996). 
88. See generally Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legisla-
tive Issues in Black and White, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287 (1999); Robert S. Mcin-
tyre & Michael J. Mcintyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 
9(JJ {1999). 
89. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 & n.12 {1978); accord Lyng v. Castillo, 
477 u.s. 635, 638 (1986). 
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tween the government and the individual. This type of coercion 
occurs when government assumes an adversarial position vis-a-
vis the individual with respect to a fundamental right, or when 
government exhibits hostility toward the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right. The criminal cases-Griffin, Douglas, and Gideon-are 
all prime examples, where the state serves as prosecutor against 
the criminal defendant, seeking to deprive him of his physical 
freedom. The state's effort to impose paternity in Streater is also 
an example of power and resources coercion. The government's 
duty to compensate in these cases does not depend upon the ex-
istence of a government-created financial barrier. Instead, the 
duty to compensate is derived from government pressure against 
the individual in a way that threatens to radically alter the indi-
vidual's place in the world and his relationships with others. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the argument for compensation 
will be stronger when both types of coercion are found to exist. 
In the most recent equal access case, M.L.B., both types of coer-
cion were present. The state imposed a direct financial barrier by 
demanding payment of appellate costs before an appeal could be 
heard, and the state was in an adversarial position vis-a-vis the 
mother, seeking to terminate her parental rights. Indeed, the ex-
istence of both types of coercion is what distinguishes M.L.B. 
from Lassiter, in which only the second type of coercion was pre-
sent. In Lassiter, the state's power and resource advantage over 
the indigent mother was not sufficient, by itself, to trigger gov-
ernment's duty to compensate by providing her with a free at-
torney to contest the termination of her parental rights. 
The degree of coercion necessary to trigger government's 
duty to compensate is also a function of the importance of the 
right at stake for the individual. With respect to fundamental 
constitutional rights, relatively modest coercion may be enough 
to trigger government's duty to remove the source of the coer-
cion or compensate for its effect. Conversely, when the right at 
stake is less important, a far greater degree of coercion will be 
necessary. The equal access cases provide support for this "slid-
ing scale" approach.90 Measured in terms of the actual court 
90. In many respects, this "sliding scale" approach to coercion resembles the ap-
proach to equal protection advocated by Justice Thurgood Marshall. See San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (urging 
a "reasoned approached" to equal protection analysis in which "concentration is placed 
upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals 
in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and 
the asserted state interests in support of the classification") (citations and internal quota-
tions omitted). Indeed, Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez provides a more nu-
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costs that the litigants sought to have waived in each case, the fi-
nancial pressure in Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein was virtually iden-
tical: $60 to file for divorce, $50 to file for bankruptcy, and $25 to 
appeal an adverse welfare decision. But while the degree of co-
ercion felt by poor litigants was essentially the same, only in 
Boddie was the government required to compensate for its ef-
fect. The right at stake in Boddie-the right to marry, a compo-
nent of the fundamental right to privacy-was simply more im-
portant than the economic rights at stake in Kras and Ortwein. 
Finally, although the equal access cases impose no such re-
quirement, some consideration of the government's intent may 
be warranted. Such an inquiry is consistent with basic constitu-
tional doctrine that regards deliberate violations of the Constitu-
tion as far more serious than governmental actions that onl¥ in-
cidentally and unintentionally burden constitutional rights. 1 A 
government program that provides grants to artists is not uncon-
stitutional merely because it may have the incidental effect of 
discouraging art critical of the government or its policies, but a 
government program that represents a calculated attempt to 
suppress disfavored viewpoints raises grave First Amendment 
concerns.92 Similarly, provisions in the tax code that favor single 
over married filers are not unconstitutional merely because they 
may have the incidental effect of discouraging marriage,93 but 
deliberate efforts to restrict or discourage marriage, to penalize 
the institution of marriage, or to discriminate based on marital 
status raise serious constitutional concems.94 
Discerning government's intent is always a difficult task, 
and an illicit motive, by itself, is insufficient to invalidate gov-
anced-and more principled-explanation of the early equal access cases than most legal 
scholars or the Supreme Court itself have offered. See id. at 93,98-105, 117-23. 
91. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 331 (1986); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976). 
92. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,587 (1998) (noting 
that if the National Endowment for the Arts "were to leverage its power to award subsi-
dies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints," the con-
stitutionality of the NEA might be in doubt). 
93. See Druker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982) 
{"[T]he marriage penalty is most certainly not an attempt to interfere with the individ-
~al's freedom [to marry]. It would be altogether absurd to suppose that Congress, in fix-
I~g the rate sched~es in 1%9, had any invidious intent to discourage or penalize mar-
nage-an estate enJoyed by the vast majority of its members.") (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
94. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978) {holdi~g that a Wisconsin law requiring a court order granting the pennission to 
~arry, conditiOned upon proof of compliance with child support obligations, significantly 
mterferes With the fundamental right to marry). 
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ernment action that is otherwise constitutional.95 But when ei-
ther of the two types of coercion described earlier-economic 
coercion or power and resources coercion-is coupled with evi-
dence of an intentional effort by government to interfere with a 
fundamental constitutional right, the argument for imposing 
compensating obligations upon government becomes most com-
pelling.96 With these basic parameters in mind, I will now explain 
how the theory of compensating rights might be used to chal-
lenge the Supreme Court's abortion funding decisions. 
III. COMPENSATING RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC 
FUNDING OF ABORTION 
Though useful in virtually any context, the theory of com-
pensating rights is particularly illuminating when applied to the 
Supreme Court's abortion funding decisions, which have largely 
sidestepped the equal access cases and failed to appreciate their 
significance. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S ABORTION 
FUNDING DECISIONS 
In Beal v. Doe,97 the Supreme Court decided a statutory 
question related to the public funding of abortion, holding that 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require states that 
participate in the federal Medicaid program to fund nonthera-
peutic abortions.98 Maher v. Roe,99 a companion case to Beal, 
presented a related constitutional question: Must a state that 
participates in Medicaid pay for nontherapeutic abortions when 
it pays for medical services related to childbirth? 
95. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar 
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitu-
tional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."). But see Hunter v. Un-
derwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating a provision of the Alabama Constitution dis-
enfranchising persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude because the 
provision was motivated by racial animus toward blacks). 
96. SeeDorf, supra note 87, at 1181 ("In general, laws having the purpose of frus-
trating the exercise of a right pose greater dangers than either facilitative targeted restric-
tions or incidental burdens arising out of neutral laws."). 
97. 432 u.s. 438 (1977). 
98. States that participate in Medicaid receive federal funding to provide medical 
assistance to needy persons. Though Title XIX does not require the states to provide 
funding for all forms of medical treatment, it does require that state Medicaid plans es-
tablish "reasonable standards" for determining the extent of covered services. See id. at 
440-41 & n.2. 
99. 432 u.s. 464 (1977). 
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In Maher, Connecticut limited state Medicaid benefits for 
first trimester abortions to those that were "medically neces-
sary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecti-
cut's regulation was challenged by a group of indigent women 
who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of medical 
necessity. A three-judge federal district court panel invalidated 
the Connecticut regulation for impermissibly "weight[ing] the 
choice of the pregnant mother against choosin9 to exercise her 
constitutionally protected right" to an abortion. 00 The Supreme 
Court reversed on a narrow 5-4 vote. Drawing a distinction be-
tween "direct state interference with a protected activity and 
state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with 
legislative policy,"101 the Court concluded that Connecticut had 
done nothing to interfere with the right to an abortion: 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An 
indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvan-
tage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund child-
birth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
sources for the service she desires. The State may have made 
childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing 
the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on ac-
cess to abortions that was not already there.102 
Three years later, in Harris v. McRae, 103 the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which 
barred the use of any federal funds to reimburse state Medicaid 
programs for the costs of performing aborti0l1S, unless a 
woman's pregnancy would place her life in danger, or the preg-
nancy was the result of rape or incest. 104 As in Maher, the plain-
tiffs in McRae argued that by subsidizing medical services re-
lated to childbirth, but excluding abortion from Medicaid 
coverage, the government effectively coerced indigent pregnant 
women into bearing children they would otherwise elect not to 
have. Once again, the Court rejected this argument: 
[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice 
100. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660,663--64 (1975). 
101. Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,475 (1977). 
102. ld at 474. 
103. 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
104. See id. at 302. The Hyde Amendment was named for its congressional sponsor, 
Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois. It was originally adopted in 1976 as an amend-
ment to the annual appropriation bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (now the Department of Health and Human Services). See id. 
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carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial re-
sources to avail herself of the full range of protected 
choices .... [A]lthough government may not place obstacles 
in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it 
need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls 
in the latter category .... Although Congress has opted to 
subsidize medically necessary services generally, but not cer-
tain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the 
Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the 
same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medi-
cally necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress 
had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all. 105 
The majority decisions in both Maher and McRae virtually 
ignored the equal access cases. Indeed, the McRae majority con-
tained no mention whatsoever of these cases, while the Maher 
majority dismissed them in two brief footnotes. In the first of 
these footnotes, the Maher majority distinguished Boddie based 
on the state's monopolization of the procedure for obtaining a 
divorce.106 In a later footnote, the Court likewise dismissed Grif-
fin and Douglas as cases "grounded in the criminal justice sys-
tem, a governmental monopoly in which participation is com-
pelled. "107 
The Court's narrow focus on the existence of a government 
"monopoly" in Boddie, Griffin, and Douglas misses entirely the 
larger principle at the heart of all of the equal access cases: It is 
government coercion-particularly with respect to a fundamen-
tal right-that triggers government's duty to compensate. A 
government monopoly isn't objectionable in itself; it is constitu-
tionally problematic only because it constrains the range of 
choices available to the individual, exerting a coercive effect on 
the individual's decisionmaking process. A more thoughtful con-
sideration of the equal access cases might have yielded a differ-
ent result in Maher and McRae. 
B. PROCREATIVE CHOICE: A FuNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
AT THE TOP OF THE HIERARCHY 
The threshold requirement for application of the theory of 
compensating rights-the existence of a fundamental constitu-
105. Jd.at316-17. 
106. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-70 n.S ("Because Connecticut has made no attempt 
to monopolize the means for terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case 
is easily distinguished from Boddie."). 
107. Id. at 471 n.6. 
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tional right-poses little difficulty. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that individual choice in matters of procreation lies at 
the heart of the right to privacy: "If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child."108 The decision whether to continue or termi-
nate a pregnancy has a unique, life-altering dimension, every bit 
as significant and worthy of constitutional protection as the right 
to marry in Boddie or the right to a relationship with one's own 
child in M.L.B. Indeed, procreative liberty, including the right to 
obtain an abortion, is but one important facet of physical lib-
erty,109 and to coerce or compel a woman to carry a pregnancy to 
term is not altogether different from the sacrifice of liberty 
which the state demands of convicted criminals. Laurence Tribe 
takes this argument even further: 
[T]he most striking thing about governmental choices like the 
one upheld in McRae-choices that leave some women with 
no alternative to continuing an unwanted pregnancy through 
childbirth-is that they require those women to make affirma-
tive use of their bodies for childbearing purposes. Such gov-
ernmental choices, in fact, require women to sacrifice their 
liberty, and quite literally their labor, in order to enable oth-
ers to survive and grow in circumstances likely to create life-
long attachments and burdens. Indeed, there seems to me to 
be a strong parallel between a woman's right not to remain 
pregnant and every person's inalienable right not to be en-
slaved.110 
Griffin, Gideon, and Douglas required that criminal defen-
dants be provided with free transcripts and attorneys to compen-
sate for the inequality of power and resources that threatened to 
deprive the defendants of their physical liberty. Boddie, Streater, 
and M.L.B. required government to compensate for coercive 
pressure that threatened to deprive the individuals of liberties 
protected by the fundamental right to privacy. The decision 
108. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972). 
109. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("(T]he liberty of 
the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. 
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, 
to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the hu-
man race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others 
and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she 
make the sacrifice."). 
110. Tribe, supra note 17, at 337. 
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whether to terminate a pregnancy implicates precisely the same 
kinds of fundamental interests that led the Court in the equal ac-
cess cases to demand compensation.111 The only remaining ques-
tion is whether government's decision to subsidize medical ex-
penses incident to childbirth while excluding from Medicaid 
coverage expenses related to abortion is sufficiently coercive to 
trigger government's duty to compensate. 
C. FUNDING CHILDBIRTH BUT NOT ABORTION: 
A LEGITIMATE VALUE JUDGMENT OR 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL COERCION? 
At the outset, it is important to remember that the principal 
constitutional claim in Maher and McRae was not that there is an 
independent constitutional right to a state-financed abortion, but 
rather that government's decision to subsidize medical expenses 
related to pregnancy and childbirth while denying public funding 
for abortion had the effect of coercing poor pregnant women 
into having children they would otherwise elect not to have. In 
rejecting this contention, the Maher majority advanced two re-
lated arguments. First, in choosing to fund childbirth but not 
abortion, government places no obstacle in the path of a poor 
woman seeking to obtain an abortion. Second, any obstacle in 
the path of a poor woman seeking an abortion is the product of 
the woman's own indigency, and ~overnment need not remove 
any obstacle that it did not create. 12 Relying heavily on Maher, 
the McRae majority simply reiterated these two essential 
points.113 
Though the Supreme Court declined to view it as such, the 
disparity in funding available for childbirth and abortion is coer-
cive in both of the senses I have described. The funding disparity 
functions in precisely the same way as a government-created fi-
nancial barrier that burdens a fundamental right, and it places 
the government in an adversarial position vis-a-vis the individual 
with respect to a fundamental right. 
In concluding that the funding disparity in Maher and 
McRae placed no obstacle in the path of a poor woman seeking 
an abortion, the Supreme Court focused superficially on the 
111. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (placing Roe v. Wade "at the intersection of two lines 
of decisions," those which accord protection to "liberty relating to intimate relationships, 
the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child," and those which 
protect "personal autonomy and bodily integrity"). 
112. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977). 
113. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,316-17 (1980). 
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form of the Medicaid program rather than its substantive effect. 
Had government chosen to impose a direct tax on the abortion 
procedure, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court would 
have invalidated the levy as an unconstitutional obstacle to the 
abortion right. But government's decision to fund childbirth 
while excluding abortion from Medicaid coverage has precisely 
the same effect as a direct tax on abortion because it makes abor-
tion more costly relative to childbirth. 
Speiser v. Randal/114 provides an excellent illustration of this 
point. At issue in Speiser was a California law that provided a 
property tax exemption to qualified veterans who filed a stan-
dard application with the local assessor. In 1954, the application 
form was revised to add a loyalty oath. The plaintiffs were hon-
orably discharged veterans who were denied the tax exemption 
solely because they refused to subscribe to the oath.115 The Su-
preme Court held that the denial of the tax exemption violated 
the First Amendment: "To deny an exemption to claimants who 
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for 
such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were 
to fine them for this speech."116 By subsidizing medical expenses 
incident to childbirth while denying any coverage for services re-
lated to abortion, the overall effect of the Medicaid program on 
poor pregnant women is identical: They are deterred from ob-
taining abortions just as surely as if the state had imposed a di-
rect tax or fine on abortion. As Justice Brennan explained in his 
dissent in McRae: 
By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and 
none of the expenses incurred in terminating a pregnancy, the 
Government literally makes an offer that the indigent woman 
cannot afford to refuse. It matters not that in this instance the 
Government has used the carrot rather than the stick. What is 
critical is the realization that as a practical matter, many pov-
erty-stricken women will choose to carry their pregnancy to 
term simply because the Government provides funds for the 
associated medical services, even though these same women 
I I4. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
II5. Seeid at514-15. 
I I6. ld at 518; see also National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,587 
(1998) ("[E]ven in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not aim at the sup-
presswn of dangerous ideas, and if a subsidy were manipulated to have a coercive effect, 
then relief could be appropriate .... In addition, as the NEA itself concedes a more 
P.r~ssing co~stitution~l question would arise if Government funding resulted in the impo-
SitiOn of a d1sproportwnate burden calculated to drive certain ideas or certain viewpoints 
from the marketplace.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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would have chosen to have an abortion if the Government 
had also paid for that option, or indeed if the Government 
had stayed out of the picture altogether and had defrayed the 
costs of neither procedure. ['I] The fundamental flaw in the 
Court's due process analysis, then, is its failure to acknowl-
edge that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of 
governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of funda-
mental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of 
those rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions. 117 
Another example may prove helpful here. Suppose that the 
state of Virginia had responded to Harper with a tax credit of 
$1.50 for every voter who had his or her name removed from the 
voter registration rolls. There is little doubt that the Supreme 
Court would have found such a scheme to be invalid for the 
same reason that the poll tax itself was declared unconstitu-
tional- it creates a disincentive to vote that is felt most acutely 
by the poor. If government cannot directly tax the right to vote, 
then it cannot achieve the same result indirectly by offering a tax 
credit to those who give up the right to vote. And to hold other-
wise would violate the old admonition that prevents government 
from seeking to accomplish indirectly that which it is prohibited 
from doing directly. 
In Williams v. Illinois, 118 for example, the Supreme Court re-
lied heavily on Griffin in concluding that the state may not con-
stitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by 
statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine: "A 
statute permitting a sentence of both imprisonment and fine 
cannot be parlayed into a longer term of imprisonment than is 
fixed by the statute since to do so would be to accomplish indi-
rectly as to an indigent that which cannot be done directly."119 In 
other contexts, the Supreme Court has been similarly vigilant in 
preventing government from achieving indirectly that which it is 
prohibited from doing directly. In the aftermath of Brown v. 
117. McRae, 448 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
118. 399 u.s. 235 (1970). 
119. /d. at 243; see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) ("Constitu-
tional rights would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied or manipulated out 
of existence.") (citations and internal quotations omitted); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 
70,92 (1995) ("In effect, the District Court has devised a remedy to accomplish indirectly 
what it admittedly Jacks the remedial authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict 
transfer of students."); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 
U.S. 246, 265 (1951) ("The function of the District Court is not simply to serve as a fa-
cade behind which the (Federal Power] Commission is enabled to accomplish indirectly 
what it cannot do directly."). 
2005] COMPENSATING RIGHTS 127 
Board of Education,120 many southern states and localities at-
tempted to avoid desegregation by privatizing public schools, 
parks, and recreational facilities. The Supreme Court routinely 
invalidated such schemes.121 
The preceding discussion is not intended to call into ques-
tion the constitutionality of all government funding decisions, 
but merely to illustrate the inconsistency with which the Su-
preme Court approaches the problem of coercion. When gov-
ernment resources are allocated in a manner intended to dis-
courage the expression of disfavored viewpoints, the Court does 
not hesitate to describe such programs as unconstitutionally co-
ercive, akin to a "penalty" on speech. But when government re-
sources are allocated in a manner designed to discourage abor-
tion-a similarly disfavored but constitutionally protected 
right-the Court characterizes the choice as a legitimate "value 
judgment" designed to "encourage actions deemed to be in the 
public interest."122 The Court's greater tolerance for coercive 
funding programs that burden privacy than for those which bur-
den speech is inconsistent with the hierarchy of fundamental 
rights apparent from Turner v. Safley. In light of this hierarchy, 
one would expect just the opposite approach: A far greater con-
cern for government funding schemes that burden the right to 
privacy than for those that burden freedom of speech, just as 
Turner was far more troubled by a prison regulation that prohib-
ited inmates from marrying one another than it was by a regula-
tion that prohibited inmates from corresponding with one an-
other. 
The majority's related argument in both Maher and 
McRae-that the obstacle to abortion for poor women is indi-
gency and that government need not remove any obstacle that it 
didn't create-fares no better when subjected to careful scrutiny. 
In Gideon and Douglas, the defendants' own indigency was the 
only obstacle preventing them from obtaining the assistance of 
counsel. Government was nevertheless required to provide ac-
120. 347U.S.483(1954). 
121. See, e.g., St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1%2); Griffin v. 
County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1%4); Evans v. Newton, 382 
U.S. 296 (1%6); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). But see Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that a city's decision to close all public swim-
ming pools rather than attempting to operate them on a desegregated basis did not vio-
late the equal protection clause). Palmer can be distinguished on the grounds that the 
city's decision-though perhaps motivated by racial prejudice-did not have a disparate 
racial impact. See id. at 226. 
122. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474,476 (1977). 
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cess to an attorney. In Streater, government was likewise re-
quired to provide free blood testing to a defendant in a paternity 
action even though the defendant's own indigency was what pre-
vented him from obtaining the necessary tests. 
Indeed, indigency is the real barrier in all of the equal access 
cases. The poll tax in Harper, the court costs in Boddie, and the 
filing fees in Lubin didn't prevent the poor from voting, or ob-
taining divorces, or running for office. The barrier in all of these 
cases was that the poor couldn't afford the fees. The subtle fi-
nancial pressure on fundamental rights that was constitutionally 
impermissible in these cases was deemed constitutionally unob-
jectionable in Maher and McRae. 
Government's efforts to influence the decisions of women 
with respect to abortion, rooted in hostility to the abortion right 
itself, is also coercive in a manner analogous to the adversarial 
role of government that triggered compensating obligations in 
cases such as Gideon, Douglas, Streater, and M.L.B. In Gideon, 
for example, government placed no obstacle between the poor 
defendant and his attorney; the only obstacle was Clarence 
Gideon's lack of funds. The Court nevertheless required the 
state to appoint counsel for Gideon because it provided him with 
a buffer against the enormous resources and coercive power of 
the state, helping to ensure a fair trial while preserving the inde-
pendence and integrity of his decisionmaking process. 
A woman faced with a life-altering decision whether to ter-
minate her pregnancy needs a similar buffer that enables her to 
reach an informed and intelligent decision free from financial 
pressure or other forms of coercion. But the buffer surrounding 
the abortion decision originally constructed in Roe v. Wade and 
enlarged in subsequent decisions123 has steadily eroded, allowing 
government to exert extraordinary pressure on a woman's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy. Maher and McRae marked the 
beginning of this steady erosion, approving programs that subsi-
dized childbirth but excluded abortion from Medicaid coverage. 
123. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,69 (1976) (invalidating a 
requirement that a woman seeking an abortion obtain the consent of her spouse since the 
state cannot delegate veto power that the state itself is prohibited from exercising); City 
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 443-45, 449-51 
(1983) (invalidating regulations designed to influence a woman's informed choice be-
tween abortion and childbirth such as the required dissemination of information related 
to childbirth and adoption and an inflexible 24-hour waiting period); Thornburgh v. 
American CoiL of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,759 (1986) ("The States 
are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate 
women into continuing pregnancies."). 
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Casey continued the trend, inviting the states to adopt laws re-
quiring waiting periods and pro-childbirth counseling that serve 
to deter some women, particularly poor women, from seeking or 
obtaining abortions. 124 More recently, a number of states have 
adopted so-called "TRAP" laws-targeted restrictions on abor-
tion providers-which impose strict health and building code re-
quirements upon abortion clinics that often require expensive 
modifications, raising the cost of abortions or driving abortion 
providers out of business entirely.125 Collectively, these restric-
tions on the abortion right exert a powerful coercive effect on 
poor pregnant women. They not only influence, but may actually 
corrupt, the decisionmaking process. When government's power 
and resources are aligned so fully against the interests of an indi-
vidual, cases such as Gideon, Douglas, Streater, and M.L.B. re-
quire that the government counterbalance the coercion, protect 
fundamental rights, and preserve genuine freedom of choice. 
Not all government funding schemes that indirectly burden 
protected rights are constitutionally suspect. As the majority in 
Maher pointed out, for example, government's decision to fund 
public education without providing comparable funding for pri-
vate education is not constitutionally problematic, even though 
the disparity in funding may discourage some parents from exer-
cising their constitutionally protected right to choose private 
124. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
881-87 (1992). The Court did, however, express some concern that a 24-hour waiting pe-
riod would be particularly burdensome "for those women who have the fewest financial 
resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining 
their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others." /d. at 886 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
125. See, e.g., David E. Rovella, Spearheading High-Impact Action in Court: Abor-
tion Rights Group's Founder Oversees Lawsuits and a Staff of 10, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 17, 
2001, at B13 ("(Simon] Heller [of the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy] contends 
that the biggest threat to abortion rights is the proliferation of targeted restrictions on 
abortion providers, or TRAP laws. Such laws are used in 17 states to impose strict health 
and building code requirements on abortion clinics that, to be complied with, often re-
quire expensive physical modifications and can force some clinics to close."). 
Legal challenges to the TRAP laws of various states have met with mixed success. 
See, e.g., Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004) (invalidating por-
tions of Arizona's law, but withholding summary judgment on female patients' due proc-
ess and equal protection claims); Women's Med. Ctr. of Northwest Houston v. Bell, 248 
F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that licensing requirements that depended on whether a 
facility performed more than 300 abortions per year did not violate equal protection, but 
invalidating other provisions of the law as impermissibly vague); Greenville Women's 
Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that South Carolina's law does not 
violate due process or equal protection), cen. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001); Women's 
Med. Prof! Corp. v. Baird, 277 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that Ohio's law 
violates substantive due process by creating an undue burden on women seeking abor-
tions). 
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schooling.126 Government's decision to fund childbirth and not 
abortion is qualitatively different, however, because it is merely 
one element in an environment of coercion intended to discour-
age abortion. Viewed in isolation, the funding disparity may not 
seem particularly coercive, but when coupled with state laws re-
quiring waiting periods and pro-childbirth counseling and strin-
gent health and safety regulations applied only to abortion facili-
ties, doctors, and staff, the coercive effect on poor women is 
magnified dramatically. Indeed, the federal courts have repeat-
edly found that these kinds of government restrictions on the 
abortion right directly and measurably increase the cost and de-
crease the availability of the abortion procedure.127 These recent 
findings undermine McRae's conclusion that "[t]he financial 
constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the 
full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the 
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, 
but rather of her indigency."128 If the government sought to in-
crease the cost and decrease the availability of private education 
in a like manner, the argument for requiring government to 
counterbalance the coercion by funding private education on par 
with public education would be similarly compelling. 129 
The Casey decision marked a dramatic change in the Su-
preme Court's abortion jurisprudence. While professing to reaf-
firm the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade, the pivotal joint opin-
ion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
abandoned Roe's "rigid trimester framework" in favor of a new 
"undue burden" standard.130 The joint opinion defined an "un-
126. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 476-77. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon law that required the parent or guard-
ian of a child to send the child to a public school. The Court held that the law "unrea-
sonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control." !d. at 534-35. See generally Paula 
Abrams, The Little Red Schoolhouse: Pierce, State Monopoly of Education and the Poli-
tics of Intolerance, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 61 (2003). 
127. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885--86; Tucson Woman's Clinic, 379 F.3d at 541-42; 
Women's Med. Ctr. of Northwest Houston, 248 F.3d at 415 (noting that stringent licensing 
requirements would increase cost of abortion by as much as $100 per procedure); 
Greenville Women's Clinic, 222 F.3d at 162 (citing district court findings that South Caro-
lina's regulations would increase the cost of abortions by $23 to $368 in certain areas); 
Women's Med. Prof/ Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 876-77 (noting that an Ohio regulation, if 
applied to a particular abortion provider, would force the closure of the clinic and would 
completely foreclose women from obtaining abortions in the Dayton area). 
128. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,316 (1980). 
129. Cf. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) 
(school board's decision to close the county's public schools while contributing to the 
support of private segregated schools denied black students equal protection of the laws). 
130. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79. 
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due burden" as "shorthand for the conclusion that a state regula-
tion has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the ~ath of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe-
tus," 31 language which parallels the Court's finding in Maher 
and McRae that government had placed "no obstacles ... in the 
pregnant woman's path to an abortion."132 
Under Casey's undue burden standard, "a state measure de-
signed to persuade [a woman] to choose childbirth over abortion 
will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal,"133 as will regu-
lations which create a "structural mechanism by which the 
State ... may express profound respect for the life of the un-
born."134 Consistent with these observations, the Supreme Court 
upheld Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting period coupled with the 
provision of informational materials regarding alternatives to 
abortion. 135 Casey also reaffirmed the Court's conclusion in 
Maher and McRae that government is not required to subsidize 
abortion simply because it subsidizes medical expenses related to 
childbirth.136 These restrictions on abortion were not sufficiently 
coercive, in the Court's view, to trigger compensating obligations 
designed to safeguard the right to abortion. 
In support of its conclusion that government may restrict 
the availability of abortion without violating the core right pro-
tected by Roe v. Wade, Casey noted that "not every law which 
makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an in-
fringement of that right," just as "not every ballot access limita-
tion amounts to an infringement of the right to vote."137 States 
must be given the flexibility to adopt measures designed to en-
sure that the woman's choice is "thoughtful and informed"138 
even if such measures have "the incidental effect of making it 
more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion," 139 just 
as the states are "granted substantial flexibility in establishing 
131. /d. at FJ77. 
132. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977). 
133. Casey, 505 U.S. at FJ78. 
134. /d. at FJ77. 
135. See id. at 881--87. 
136. See id. at 874-75, FJ78 (citing language in Maher and McRae rejecting an "un-
qualified constitutional right to abortion" in favor of a description of the abortion right as 
one which "protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference," and concluding 
that the state may adopt measures to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abor-
tion). 
137. /d. at 873. 
138. /d. at FJ72. 
139. /d. at FJ74. 
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the framework within which voters choose the candidates for 
whom they wish to vote. "140 
Casey's choice of analogies is curious, because the kinds of 
state regulations of abortion sustained in Casey would be re-
garded as coercive and patently unconstitutional if applied to the 
right to vote. A ballot access limitation that makes it more diffi-
cult or more expensive for the poor to vote or to run for office is 
regarded as an unconstitutional interference with the right to 
vote. That's precisely the point made in cases such as Harper, 
Bullock, and Lubin.m But beyond these cases, which the Court 
overlooked in Maher, McRae, and Casey, suppose that a state, in 
an effort to create a more informed and intelligent electorate, 
imposes a modest poll tax of $5 on the assumption that people 
will cast more thoughtful votes if they have to pay for the privi-
lege.142 Suppose further that the state imposes a two-hour wait-
ing period at every polling place, during which time the voter is 
asked to read informational materials describing all of the can-
didates and ballot measures. 
There is no question that such measures would serve gov-
ernment's le,5itimate interest in fostering informed and intelli-
gent voting.1 But there is also no question that such measures 
would create a "substantial obstacle" to voting, rendering them 
unconstitutional.144 The modest commitment of time and effort 
140. /d. at 873-74. 
141. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Bullock 
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1972); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 7(1}, 716 (1974). 
142. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I)t is certainly a ra-
tional argument that payment of some minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility, 
weeding out those who do not care enough about public affairs to pay $1.50 or there-
abouts a year for the exercise of the franchise."). 
143. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 
(1989) ("Certainly the State has a legitimate interest in fostering an informed elector-
ate."); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983) ("There can be no question 
about the legitimacy of the State's interest in fostering informed and educated expres-
sions of the popular will in a general election."). 
144. Following ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolishing the poll tax 
as a requirement for voting in federal elections, Virginia removed the poll tax as an abso-
lute prerequisite to qualification for voting in federal elections, but replaced it with a 
provision whereby the federal voter could qualify either by paying the customary poll tax 
or by filing a certificate of residence six months before the election. In Harman v. Forss-
enius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), the Supreme Court invalidated the new provision. The Court 
noted that "constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied 
or manipulated out of existence." !d. at 540 (citations and internal quotations omitted); 
see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-4> (holding that a state's interest in knowl-
edgeable and intelligent voting is insufficient to sustain a one-year durational residency 
requirement). But cf Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (sustaining Arizona's 50-day 
residency requirement and voter registration deadline based on the state's need for a 
reasonable time period in which to prepare accurate voter lists). 
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required to vote in elections today is enough to keep roughly 
half of registered voters away from the polls. One can only guess 
how low voter turnout might be if every voter left the polling 
place $5 and two hours poorer. 
Voting is a personal and private matter, and when a voter 
arrives at her polling place, the state assumes that the voter has 
thoughtfully considered her choices. Indeed, all 50 states have, 
through legislation, created restricted zones around polling 
places to prevent voter coercion and to safeguard the right to 
vote.145 In Burson v. Freeman, 146 decided just one month before 
Casey, the Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that 
such restricted zones are constitutional, even when the~ suppress 
core political speech in the vicinity of the ballot box. 1 7 The Su-
preme Court plainly understood the need for a private and se-
cure environment-free from coercion or undue influence-in 
which voters may make thoughtful and intelligent decisions of 
extraordinary importance: "The State of Tennessee has decided 
that these last 15 seconds before its citizens enter the polling 
place should be their own, as free from interference as possible. 
We do not find that this is an unconstitutional choice."14 
Somewhat paradoxically, the Supreme Court has upheld 
legislative efforts designed to insulate pregnant women from the 
private coercion of anti-abortion protesters. In Hill v. Colo-
rado,149 the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a Colorado statute regulating speech-related conduct 
within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility. Spe-
cifically, the statute made it unlawful for any person to "know-
ingly approach" within eight feet of another person, without that 
person's consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill 
to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or 
counseling with such other person."150 In upholding the legisla-
tion, the Court emphasized the "particularly vulnerable physical 
and emotional conditions" of those who are attempting to enter 
A two-hour polling place waiting period, coupled with informational materials de-
signed to ensure more thoughtful and intelligent voting, would also likely violate the fed-
eral Voting Rights Act. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 357 & n.29; 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (2000). 
145. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992); see also Robert Brett 
Dunham, Note, Defoliating the Grassroots: Election Day Restrictions on Political Speech, 
77 GEO. L.J. 2137,2143 (1989) (summarizing state statutes as of 1989). 
146. 504 u.s. 191 (1992). 
147. See id. at 211. 
148. See id. at 210. 
149. 530 u.s. 703 (2000). 
150. /d. at 707. 
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health care facilities, and noted that government has "a substan-
tial interest in controlling the activity around certain public and 
private places" such as "schools, courthouses, polling places, and 
private homes."151 
The effect of decisions like Maher, McRae, and Casey is to 
deny to poor pregnant women the same kind of private and se-
cure environment-free from coercion and undue influence-in 
which to make a thoughtful and intelligent decision of extraordi-
nary importance. The very kind of state interference that would 
be regarded as coercive and patently unconstitutional with re-
spect to voting is considered constitutionally unobjectionable 
with respect to procreative decisionmaking. As a result, govern-
ment actively discourages abortion through its funding choices, 
as well as through a myriad of restrictions designed to deter 
women from seeking or obtaining abortions. This deterrent ef-
fect is neither incidental nor unintentional; it is, instead, the 
foreseeable and desired result.152 The theory of compensating 
rights set forth in this Article would require government either 
to remove its coercive pressure on the abortion decision or to 
counterbalance it by funding abortion on an equal footing with 
childbirth. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last 50 years, the Supreme Court has been largely 
unwilling to loosen the jurisprudential moorings that limit cases 
guaranteeing equal access to the courts and equal access to the 
political process. But at the heart of the equal access cases is 
something more: a profound commitment to providing the indi-
vidual with the means to resist government coercion. Coercion in 
any form is constitutionally troublesome because it robs indi-
viduals of choice and ultimately destroys the very essence of 
freedom. But government coercion is most sinister when di-
rected at those least able to resist it. 
Government's decision to subsidize childbirth but not abor-
tion through Medicaid exhibits all of the hallmarks of this most 
sinister form of government coercion, which is felt only by poor 
women attempting to exercise their constitutionally protected 
right to make procreative decisions. Indeed, financial induce-
151. !d. at 728-29. 
152. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 330-31 & n.4 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (describing the Hyde Amendment "for what it really is-a deliberate effort to dis-
courage the exercise of a constitutionally protected right"). 
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ments offered to poor women to persuade them not to procure 
abortions should provoke the same moral outrage that accom-
panied revelations that poor blacks were offered financial in-
ducements to persuade them not to vote. Just as the equal access 
cases require the government either to remove or to compensate 
for coercive financial barriers that bar the poor from access to 
the courts or the political process, so too government must either 
remove or compensate for coercive pressure designed to per-
suade poor women to choose childbirth over abortion. Such a re-
sult would fulfill Casey's rhetorical promise that "the most inti-
mate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" should be 
made free!~ by the individual, rather than "under compulsion of 
the State." 53 
!53. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992}. 
